KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND CULTURE OF SECURITY

JOSÉ MARÍA BLANCO NAVARRO

TECHNICAL OFFICE OF THE GUARDIA CIVIL

To know what you know and what you do not know, that is true knowledge.

Confucius

ABSTRACT

In times like these, of dizzying change, of enormous complexity and interrelation between originally separate phenomena, and of high levels of uncertainty, knowledge and its management within all organizational processes has become a duty of increased importance. It is an obligation which enables said organizations to make progress in how they anticipate and construct the future, as well as how they adapt to difficult scenarios, identify new risks, threats, and opportunities.

To this end, this article highlights those main sources of knowledge in terms of security and summarizes the strategic objective of knowledge. A strategic design involves having knowledge, intelligence and a clear vision for the future. Regarding security, new models of decision-making, based on knowledge management and provision, are viable options in situations of uncertainty.

Finally, knowledge has a clear purpose: its dissemination and utilization. The Culture of Homeland Security is the dissemination of knowledge on security matters to the various agents who participate in the system, contributing to the necessary creation of a Culture of National Security.

Key words: Knowledge, security, intelligence, strategy, decision-making

1. KNOWLEDGE FOR SECURITY

Wise is not the man who knows where the treasure is buried, but the one who works in order to get it out.

Francisco de Quevedo

According to Davenport and Prusak (2000), news is turned into knowledge through processes of comparison, as well as the collection of consequences, connections and conversations. Therefore, knowledge can be defined as the complete, informed understanding of something. It is a mixture of experience, values, contextual information and expert internationalization which creates a frame for assessing and including new experiences and information. It can be considered both as a process and as a product, and it is always action-oriented.

Knowledge is an intermediary. It is not an end in itself, but it must meet certain objectives. In the case of police organizations, knowledge is a means through which to better seek ways of assuring the free exercise of rights and freedoms as well as public safety, as is written in Article 104 of the Spanish Constitution.

In any case, the concept of security is always evolving and this brings with it the obligation to adapt working processes, methodologies and techniques. Security is a desire which connects with the basic human instincts of preserving life, ensuring pleasure and welfare, and avoiding pain or any other kind of suffering, together with emotions that can anticipate them or which go hand in hand with them such as anxiety, fear or dread (Jaime, de la Corte, Blanco, 2014). Various terms have been coined through history and used in the last years in order to define this collective instinct, such as: public safety, collective security, internal security, social security or human security. Nowadays, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the key concept which guides national strategic models of security in order to manage risk and threats is "national security". However, this concept is not new. On July 26th 1947, US president Harry S. Truman signed the first National Security Act. In 1948, diplomat George Kennan defined national security as "the continued ability of the country to pursue the development of its internal life without serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers" (Laborie, 2011). Jaime, de la Corte and Blanco (2014) define National Security as the "ideal situation that arises thanks to the efficient and joint action of the State and other agents, where citizens' freedom and welfare, territorial defense, and integrity of its constitutional principles and values, together with international security, will be completely protected and guaranteed."

Threats (circumstances or agents which pose a risk to security or stability) and risks (the probability of those threats materializing and causing damage) are changing every day, and new phenomena, groups and interrelations are always appearing. Last year alone, just to give some examples, we have witnessed the rising tension in Ukraine or the emergence of new insurgent and terrorist groups as Daesh. These have been the focus of attention of the security agenda of many different States and International Organizations. At present, many different weak signals and early warnings are emerging warning people about new centers of risk and future threats.

On this basis, knowledge maps, sources and expert guides must reflect this change correctly in order to reconcile knowledge availability and new, emerging needs, as well as to also be able to support organizational decision-making (Blanco, 2010). Let us remind ourselves that the Knowledge Map is an interactive system open for dialog, which is defined, organized and built upon the intuitive, structured and procedural behaviors used to explore and solve problems, thus facilitating the decision-making processes.

When we refer to knowledge in the field of security, we should always take the *purposes* for obtaining or managing that knowledge into account. The same applies to intelligence, a form of knowledge with specific features. Treverton (2009) makes an important categorization of the needs that intelligence tries to address and the way in which those needs are satisfied. As an example, he points out the need of having tactical, valid information, alerts about the advancement of warning indicators, pattern recognition, and categorization of emerging issues, the implications of public policies, or the establishment of future scenarios. Considering the security studies that are based on a temporal structure, the Analysis and Outlook Center of the Guardia Civil sets the objectives that can be achieved through techniques and methodologies to know the past, the present and the future:

- Regarding the past, the chief aims were to learn about potential threats, establish patterns, detect trends and learn from them. So as to do this, we can use the lessons

of the past, as well as case studies, bibliography revision, good practice, as well as the bibliographies or repositories of those agents involved in the security system.

- When it comes to the present, the chief aims nowadays are to know the different variables which define a threat, the agents who contribute to it, the impacts of different variables, the management of the unknown (detecting existing needs), security protection and guarantee, alert generation and the evaluation of policies and decisions. Among the different methodologies that can be used for these purposes, we point out PESTEL analysis, SWOT analysis, morphological analysis, structural analysis, cross-impact analysis, causal analysis, MICMAC analysis, environmental scanning, indicators, MACTOR creativity techniques, game theory, analysis of texts and announcements, interviews, group or individual profiles, red hat analysis, what-if analysis, social network analysis, deception check, information evaluation, timelines, concept maps, weak signals, early warnings, critical judgments, cost/benefit analysis, etc.

- With regards to the future, the aim is to predict, imagine and to shape the future we desire. As basic techniques we have: Big Data, trend analysis, econometrics, complex algorithms, expert systems, artificial intelligence, Godet's toolbox, visioning, futures Wheel, Delphi, analysis of competing hypotheses, back casting, what-if analysis, scenarios, gaming, simulation or modeling.

The aim with this model is to attain a comprehensive understanding, allowing us to build what we call "The Big Picture", a complete, structured representation of the phenomenon in question. Blaise Pascal, a French scientist and philosopher, said that it is far better to know something about everything than to know everything about one thing. While we do not consider this to be completely true, it does lead us to reflect on the role that specialists and generalists play in the field of knowledge, a debate that should not be simplified merely by opting for one or the other. Expert specialized knowledge is needed just as much as experts are needed to integrate all that fractionated knowledge into our plans for action.

In short, it is necessary to create new models for the study of security, taking into account that, in many cases, there is no need to develop new theories, but merely to apply existing ones and adapt them to the object of study or to the characteristics of our organizations. The creation of metamodels is one of the ways of integrating this dispersed knowledge. While the so-called "classical" studies in security are still valid, we should also take care not to undervalue so-called "critical security studies". Traditional, more pragmatic studies (Booth, 1991, 2005), from which neorealism and neoliberalism have emerged, are based more on the idea of the Nation-State and of the study of security agencies from a perspective which categorizes other agencies as either allies or enemies. On the other hand, new critical security studies are suggesting a change of focus, centered more on the individual and on society. This new vision requires a change in investigation techniques and methodologies. Buzan's work (1983) provided a new perspective as he added political, economic, social and ecological elements to the concept of security and he stressed the idea of the central role of the individual as a basic unit of security. Krause and Williams (1996) state that our knowledge about topics, structures and practices related to international relations and security are subjective, as they are based on conceptual constructions very different to those made by observers and agents in today's world. Following this line of thought, various studies about human

security, feminism in security, constructivism and post-structuralism have been carried out. In this respect, contributions from the Copenhagen and Wales Schools of thought are particularly noteworthy.

Throughout this article, we will mention new approximations necessary for the study and generation of knowledge in security, such as "futures studies" or prospective, as well as new models of decision-making in the face of uncertainty and design of public policies. Ultimately, this means the creation of a theory of knowledge for security, an epistemology that, from a theoretical framework, also allows for its practical implementation.

2. THE END OF THE STATE MONOPOLY ON SECURITY

Wise people look for wisdom, fools think they already found it.

Napoleon I

Without a doubt, we can say that the state monopoly on security has ended. Security is a shared responsibility of many different agents. This assertion, in any case, is compatible with the clear governance of security as carried out by the State. It remains a competence of public authorities, as clearly stated in the Spanish Constitution.

If there are few doubts about this, there are even fewer about the inexistence of a monopoly on knowledge about security issues. Our societies, characterized by extreme specialization and the creation of static knowledge behaviors in enterprises, organizations or universities, are faced with the risk of ending up with the foolishness warned against by Napoleon above, the foolishness of those who believe that they are wise. Lao Tzu, whose great role in the field of security is sadly not as widely recognized as it should be, pointed out that: "Knowing that you do not know is the best. Not knowing that you do not know is an illness."

In short, Security Forces and Corps have the objective of intensifying their links with other agents in the system which also get, analyze and spread knowledge on security. In this regard, we can highlight:

- Universities. Their role goes beyond that of training young people to be professionals. Universities contribute to understanding the world in which we live, they shape the world and the society of the future, as well as being a permanent source of ideas and debates as well as a center for research and innovation. Its connection with Security Forces and Corps represents a need for understanding the general phenomena linked to security or crime. The police have data, but they lack time, specialized staff and social research methodologies. Through cooperation we need to elaborate on, for example, lines of inquiry such as evidence-based policing, which evaluates and measures the efficiency of policies developed in areas such as terrorism. We could also help the implementation of predictive systems, the so-called predictive police, and the implementation of Big Data. The joint participation of the Guardia Civil and European or Spanish Universities in projects financed by the European Union (FP7, Horizon 2020, or ISEC) is a regular occurrence.

- Think Tanks. These are centers dedicated to the production of ideas and recommendations about the world in which we live. They promote the adoption of

policies and are a place for dialogue and debate which, to a larger extent, also deal with political and security issues. In an analysis carried out by the Elcano Royal Institute, Lamo de Espinosa (2014) criticized the ability of think tanks to meet those needs not covered by universities. They analyze less specialized and more day-to-day matters, close to the political and social agenda, and with a wider range of agents (including economists, lawyers, sociologists, historians and other professionals, also from the security field). All of this turns them into intelligence communities and generates a future-oriented knowledge.

- The private sector. Knowledge provided by private security enterprises, by corporate security departments and by companies that provide security and information technologies is necessary for understanding new specific criminal phenomena; in order to cooperate in crime prevention, and to provide technologies that support police work. Among them, in particular, tools are included which improve information management and knowledge generation.

- The public and the citizens. The empowerment process of the individual is unlimited due to the widespread access to information and the democratization of knowledge. These capabilities are fueled through online collaboration and facilitated by social media. It could be defined as an online individual empowerment, which already fosters important collective intelligence initiatives (used both by public powers and security institutions) and that is useful for collaborative projects of American agencies (such as IARPA).

- Publicly-funded training, documentation, analysis and prospective centers. All of these have characteristics in common with one another: they work with knowledge and they work for knowledge. They obtain, treat and spread knowledge adapted to the aims pursued. The strengthening of knowledge networks among this center is of crucial value. We can say that knowledge leads to more knowledge, and for this reason there are usually informal and transversal collaborative networks among these departments, such as the Guardia Civil and its collaboration with the Academies, the Guardia Civil University Center, the Analysis and Outlook Center, the Historical Studies Center, etc. There is also external cooperation with different entities such as the Center for National Defense Studies (CESEDEN) or the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE).

In short, as Montesquieu said, "you have to study a great deal to know a little". To this, we can add that one should listen a lot to learn a bit more, something that Winston Churchill defined as bravery, "which is required for standing up and talking" but also for "sitting down and listening".

3. KNOWLEDGE FOR DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN TIMES OF UNCERTAINTY

"The development of history is not linear. It is full of turbulence, bifurcations, detours, periods of static immobility, periods of latency followed by virulence … History is a tangle of jostled stories, unpredictable and uncertain; it develops and shrinks, goes forward and backward, stops and starts."

Edgar Morin

Uncertainty is clearly linked with security. Moreover, it is a hallmark of our time. Economic, political, leadership or moral crises foster this feeling. In the last few years, these political and economic crises have affected citizens and enlarged the confidence gap between governments and them. Public trust levels in our governments have never been so low. We live in a society unable to find referents or role models, in the context of an unprecedented leadership crisis and a crisis of democratic systems, as the World Economic Forum points out in its report "Outlook Agenda 2015".

In aspects purely related to security, uncertainty is may occur in the variety and unpredictability of current threats.

Uncertainty is here to stay. The changing, interconnected and ubiquitous nature of today's world; technological developments; the absence of flexibility in organizations and institutions (both national and international); or the doubts about the current and the forthcoming leaders of this world only bode an increase of uncertainty. In this regard, we are left with two options. The first is regret, which leads to an increase in societal fear. This can partly be explained by the misunderstanding of current threats, which are uncertain and therefore difficult to control. It is also due to the fear of loss once high levels of security and welfare are achieved. Other interpretations include critical views about societies oriented towards risk management, forgetting about the alternative opportunity management. And, finally, we should not dismiss the value of risk assessment on the part of public authorities and the media which, due to conflicts of interest, are not always objective. As an example, we could compare the victims that Al Qaeda or Daesh have left in the USA with those victims of the attacks by right-wing extremist right groups or by the violent use of firearms among the citizens themselves. However, as Taleb (2012) claims, the possible reason for this society of fear is that, despite the low rates of violence and conflicts as compared to other moments of history, the probability that these unknown risks will materialize is much higher.

The second option is to face reality and try to manage and take advantage of this uncertainty. In this regard, there are two further alternatives, both of them compatible with one another. On the one hand, we could attempt to build more resilient societies. Taking into account that complete security is impossible, we would try to ensure a return to normality after any attack or catastrophe. This concept is integrated into all modern national security strategies. The second alternative would be to create the necessary constraints to limit the strength of the adversity, denying them the possibility of becoming stronger after chaos or uncertainty situations than before. This is what Taleb (2012) calls anti-fragility. Those organizations, people or things which get stronger in adversity are anti-fragile.

For this purpose, we have plenty of tools that once again lead us to turn to the academic world and at new theories regarding public decision-making. Rational theories for the design of public policies are obsolete. These theories consider that choices made by individuals are made following a number of rationally formed and correctly executed procedures. These incremental approaches (Lindblom, 1959) assume that, at the highest government levels, all alternatives and lines of actions are considered through an incremental process, in which many initiatives are formed, even outwith the governmental structure, including citizens, associations, lobbies or international allies.

The limitations of both models have led to the search for intermediate models. One of the most well-known of these intermediaries is the so-called *Mixed Scanning* model

developed by Etzioni (1967). Etzioni proposes the combination of a high-level decision-making process which establishes the most basic decisions, the management and the basic framework, with another, incremental, process which takes precedents into account and which implements fundamental decisions. Through incremental measures, the system is changed, laws are adjusted and planned actions are carried out. However, a conservative incremental process does not adjust to the demands and current security needs. There is a need to expand on the process of making fundamental and structural decisions in a way which would allow for the periodical reorientation of objectives, procedures and tools.

However, these models do not accurately reflect the reality of the current decision-making process, which in many cases is carried out neither sequentially nor as a process divisible into different phases. In this regard, we should highlight the *garbage can* proposal (March and Olsen, 1976), based on the concept that decisions are the result of a chance meeting between problems, solutions, participants and opportunities, influenced by temporary factors. This model takes us closer to the reality of a world based on uncertainty. We should also mention the *multiple streams framework* (Kingdon, 1984), which stresses the evidence of public decisions emerging from the confluence of three streams of activity: that of problems, public policies, and politics.

In *Seguridad Nacional, amenazas y respuestas* (de la Corte and Blanco, 2014), Blanco and Jaime propose the incorporation of new perspectives and the integration of models, searching for more holistic approximations which would allow us to recognize the wide-ranging, global and systematic reality of anything related to security, among them:

Models based on intelligence-led policing. A doctrine of evolutionary intelligence (and not so repetitive) must be created reconsidering and adapting the studies of Platt (1957), Hilsman (1956), Heuer (1999), Knorr (1964), Hughes (1976) or Treverton (2011).

- Theories which aim to combine incremental models with new perspectives and which are based on the detection of variables that should lead to an intentional, not incremental, and structural transformation of a public policy (Dente and Subirats, 2013).

- Collective or massive intelligence systems or the application of the *webarchy* concept (Spanish 'redarquía', a system for collective, transparent decision-making coined by José Cabrera).

- Models of analysis of classic risks, based on the standard *ISO 31000 Risk Management*, and especially those models of assessment which are continuous, such as the one included in the United Kingdom's *National Security Risk Assessment*.

- Critical security studies and critical studies on terrorism, enabling the creation of new perspectives and methodologies.

- Models for the evaluation of public policies and decision-making processes, which, when they do exist, are clearly inadequate. The research carried out on *Evidence-Based Policing* strongly supports this task.

- Models such as that of the *Balanced Scorecard* which, despite its age, can still be applied to national security (Nowakowska-Krystman, 2008).

- Janis' theories (1972) about group thinking, polarization thinking (Bray and Noble, 1978) and premature consensus thinking (Nemeth and Nemeth-Brown, 2003), which shape decision-making processes.

- The inclusion of "future studies" in strategic design and decision-making (Blanco and Jaime, 2014).

- Studies about decision-making, such as those of Khaneman (2011) or Taleb (2012), as well as the development and application of specific models for the process of decision-making in times of uncertainty.

Mansky (2013) points out that, when public policies are adopted, there is very limited understanding of its effects. This endeavor (that must be carried out previously) can be managed, albeit to a limited extent, through a forward-looking approach. One way in which to manage it is through combining all possible forms of knowledge about the future (tendencies and megatrends), the "future present" in the words of Esposito (2011), with that of those "present futures" which materialize over time. This vision enables the construction of tracking models (through different techniques such as trend analysis or horizon scanning) in which imagination and creativity can be used as a means for creating opportunities (Blanco and Cohen, 2014).

As Morin also agrees, "*We have to learn how to confront uncertainty because we live in a changing epoch where our values are ambivalent and everything is interconnected. This is why the education of the future must review the uncertainties connected with knowledge.*" Thus, we have again returned to the question of knowledge and ignorance. Let us remember Juan de Mairena, that professor described by Antonio Machado, who said that: "*the purpose of school is learning to rethink your thoughts, to unlearn what you have already learned and to doubt your own doubts, as it is only by doing this that you can ever truly believe in something.*" This is the path to follow when it comes to uncertainty: to doubt, to have a permanent thirst for knowledge and to develop the ability to constantly adapt and change your ways of thinking and understanding, casting aside what we have learned, experienced and believed before, as, in the majority of cases, these serve only as obstructions which prevent us from seeing what is waiting for us on the other side.

4. KNOWLEDGE AND STRATEGY

"Long range planning does not deal with future decisions, but with the future of present decisions."

Peter Drucker

Continuing with Edgar Morin: "*Thought is not only knowledge*". It is also "*strategy, and as with any strategy, it must not only make maximum use of its knowledge of order, but also confront uncertainty, randomness, that is, the zones of indeterminability and unpredictability that it encounters in reality*".

Moreover, we must highlight this link between strategy and tactics, usually considered two separate areas. Tacticians maintain the importance of their functions, while strategists argue the opposite. In the end, as in many fields, it is this perverse specialization which prevents us from standing up and leaving our offices to see what others are doing, a disinterest which ultimately leads to the loss of knowledge. In the security

field, there are plenty of ways of linking both aspects. One of them is through implementing early warning systems, one of the fields that most require research and development more research. As Sun Tzu once said, "*strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat*".

In general, there are four concepts that come into play in this debate in an academic context: Knowledge, Intelligence, Outlook and Strategy. These concepts are defined as follows:

- Knowledge. Knowledge is defined as the data and information processed in such a way as to fit in a context and directed towards an aim. It is as much a final product as a process.

- Intelligence. Intelligence, according to the traditional definition, is the final product of a cycle (the so-called intelligence cycle) which starts with planning and continues with obtaining information, analyzing or elaborating, and then spreading this information with the purpose of supporting decision-making. As knowledge, it is both a product and a process. However, we consider that this definition as a cycle is too restrictive and does not correspond exactly to how intelligence works, far from a cyclical and sequential structure. We advocate instead the use of the expression "process of intelligence".

- Outlook. This is the study of the future in order to be able to influence it.

- Strategy. In this particular case, we consider strategy to be the definition of a mission, a vision and certain values as a first step towards determining those actions that will allow for its fulfillment.

Knowledge is the basis for the entire system. Intelligence, as well as Outlook, could be considered specialized types of knowledge, with their own autonomy and special characteristics, as well as being suitable for strategic planning.

Therefore, Intelligence, in our sphere of security, is able to explain phenomena through a cognitive and analytical process, thus supporting the decision-making process.

However, the main difference between Intelligence and Outlook is a temporal one. Intelligence analysis does not focus on the medium or long term, although in many cases it leads us to a product that looks into forthcoming events. Besides, Outlook has a wide methodological catalog, although it has some things in common with intelligence analysis.

On this basis, we consider that strategic planning must incorporate those elements, comprising a pyramid:

Figure 1: Strategic pyramid. Source: Own elaboration

5. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE FUTURE FOR THE GUARDIA CIVIL OF THE FUTURE

"The future has many names: For the weak, it means the unattainable. For the fearful, it means the unknown. For the courageous, it means opportunity."

Victor Hugo

A prior knowledge of the future is an essential step in the creation of the Guardia Civil of the future. If the objective of the Guardia Civil is to be a security corps characterized by its proximity to the citizens, it is essential to know what that citizen will be like, their needs, their values (that will probably differ greatly from their current ones), their concerns and their expectations.

According to the Analysis and Outlook Center, the so-called future studies should include lines of forecasting research, such as foresight. At the same time, they should incorporate quantitative and qualitative aspects (human behavior, a key factor in security, cannot always be quantified).

In terms of Outlook, it is important to begin with a current analysis of the field that we want to study. An approach to those stakeholders whose actions may condition the future, as well as an approach to the factors in question (political, economic, social, technological, legal, environmental or demographic) is carried out through analysis methodologies such as PESTEL or SWOT. This primary research is the very foundation of the system. Such basic factors reveal findings regarding the future, which in some studies are called megatrends (issues that will not change in the future such as population growth, except in the case of conflict or a big catastrophe). Additionally, there are other factors which create more uncertainty (things we are aware of being

unaware of) and can generate both favorable and not favorable scenarios. These factors are known as Game Changers and the clearest example of these is technology. Finally, incidents of low probability but high impact are called Wild Cards. Examples of these would be cyberterrorism, a nuclear war or a pandemic.

Taking this into account, as well as the fields that we want to study (as Outlook can be applied to specific sectors) and the study of possible threats and risks, we create different future scenarios. We would like to stress the fact that it is not about guessing, but about establishing options (it is always possible, however, to allocate different degrees of probability).

But the most interesting part is the following phase, where actions are defined in order to arrive at the desired-for future and avoid those undesired ones. In other words, it is a process of maximizing opportunities and reducing risks.

The prospective study and analysis needs time to collect information, to compare it, to reflect on it, to develop capabilities with which to deal with it (especially creativity) and to continuously improve methodologies.

Figure 2: The world in 2030. Source: Own elaboration.

A potential prospective process is shown in the figure above. Starting from the knowledge of the world at a specific moment and, using 2030 as an example since it is the period in which a megatrend is theoretically developed (15 years), we can identify the specific characteristics of our nation, as well as all those aspects that could have an influence in the security conditions of that year. In this way, we can carry out studies of future variables, about the evaluation of the different agents and about the possible risks and threats to security. That information is an input for setting the organizational needs of a specific moment in time.

Prospective can be an input for the strategic management system. On the basis of what we have already said it could:

- Initially be a sensor of the socio-technological change processes and of the trends that start to grow, serving as the base that we have called knowledge.

- Increase the rank of actors in the international system, that increasingly include media, universities, associations, communities or the citizens themselves, creating a wider external dimension than that reflected in the usual strategic maps.

- Be a starting point in order to have a VISION that can be adapted to the environment.

- Provide with ideas for the planning, with programs and indicators (such as in the case of Corporate Social Responsibility and many projects taken out from the private world that could be implemented, always taking the mission, the vision and the values as a base).

- Additionally, the study of the future provides:

  1. A reflection about future risks and threats

  2. A different way of thinking

  3. Thoughts and reflections about the future introduces causality in the system and in the forthcoming future.

Figure 3: Prospective and Strategy. Own elaboration

The Analysis and Prospective Centre, moving forward to future projects and publications, applies methodologies for the study of the future. One of them is the trend

analysis. A trend is an observable pattern that can lead to a change, it is a gathering of processes that do not change easily and will still exist in the future. Trends are affected by drivers. A driver is an agent or factor that guides a change. From each driver we can identify indicators that help to measure and evaluate its impact. This favors a model for tracking information and is complemented by determining the effects in the future, its timing, its impact and its probability of becoming real. The study of Cohen and Blanco (2014) about the future of the fights against terrorism in Europe represents an example that follows (as some studies from the Analysis and Prospective Centre) the model chosen by RAND Europe (2013) for its analysis of the future of the society in Europe in 2030 and by Lia (2005) for the study of the future of terrorism, as well as the models used by the program Proteus of the American intelligence.

The choice of trends is made by monitoring information about social, political, economic, political, technological, environmental or legal aspects. It is also made by continuous bibliographic revisions of all the reports about the future that have been written, such as those of the US intelligence (Global trends 2030 or World Wide Threat Assessment), those of the Defence Ministry of the UK, of the World Economic Forum (Global Risks), the information from the intelligence unit of The Economist, the CSIS or publications such as Wired in the field of technology.

Taking this as a basis, and moving forward to future projects, for the Analysis and Prospective Centre these are the trends that will shape the future in security:

Political
Globalization and manifestation of its negative aspects
Leadership crisis at every level. Vague and diffuse power
Crisis of representative democracies
Reduction of the power of the nation-state and increase of non-state actors
New expectations of citizens' participation in politics and loss of confidence in the institutions
Corruption
Increase of nationalisms
Increase of extremisms and radicalization
Generalized and never-ending conflicts, increase of weak states
Increase of vigilantism. Controlled and vigilant societies

Table 1. Political trends

Economic
Globalization and economic interdependence
Increase of inequality
Evolution of unemployment, especially youth unemployment
Control of the financial system
Economic crisis: debt and liquidity
Opening of new commercial areas
Opening of new transportation routes
Energetic dependence

Global growth of the service sector
Greater demand of social responsibility to firms and organizations

Table 2. Economic trends

Social
Increase of protests and riots
Migrations
Ageing of societies
Mobility, interconnection, ubiquity and increase of travels
Individual empowerment
New participative citizens. Users, creators and politicians
Urbanization process, cities as the center of power and conflicts
Globalizations of new values
Social, cultural and religious polarizations
Inclusion of technology in individual and social capabilities

Table 3. Social trends

Technological
Development of IT and communications
Robotics
Nanotechnology
Quantum computer
New means of transport
Technologies that can have a harmful use (drones, 3D printers…)
Smart Cities
Biometry, sensors, increased human capabilities
Big Data
Increase of links between the cyber and the physical world

Table 4. Technological trends

Environmental and sanitary
Greater demand of resources
Impact of climate change
Increase of natural disasters
Pandemics
Overexploitation and removal of species
New clean technologies
Water shortage
New energy exploitation
Conflicts due to the increase in demand and scarce resources
Better health and life expectancy

Table 5. Environmental and sanitary trends

Taking this as a basis, we can say that there are 10 aspects that will be constant and central in the security agendas.

Top ten agenda in security
Conflicts and fragility in states
More links between terrorism and organized crime
Increase of low-level conflicts. Insurgencies and subversion
Management of the future urban life
Impact of technologies in security
Increase of nationalisms, extremisms and radicalization
Inequality and unemployment
Pandemics and climate change
Evolution of the Internet and social media
Evolution of the citizens. Individual and on-line empowerment

Table 6. Ten agendas of security. Analysis and Prospective Centre

As a result of these previous analysis and of a bibliographic revision of the main studies about future police challenges, this would be a possible selection of them:

20 PRESENT AND FUTURE POLICE CHALLENGES
Technological revolution. Threats control and exploitation of opportunities that come out from technology
Police agents with excellent digital capabilities for assisting the citizens and for police investigation
Actions in the cyberspace against threats that operate in the physical space and interventions in the physical space against threats and their origin
New concept of citizens-proximity. In the street and in the cyberspace. Evolution of the concept "community policing"
Increase of the interventions abroad. Conflicts that will need processes of crisis management and stabilization. Reconstruction and training of police.
International dimension of the police actions. Increasing number of people and national interests to protect abroad and interest of tourists in Spain.
A trining oriented to the development of capabilities and competences, a "know-how"
A human-resources management based on the talent
Specialization on security for the elders, due to the population ageing
Specialization in minorities, races, communities, with the aim of avoiding urban ghettos, social polarization and confrontations in the future urban life. Socio-cultural intelligence development.
Specialization in the intervention against insurgencies, subversions and other low level conflict manifestations.
Implementation of evaluation and measurement models about police efficiency. Competence according to the budget, as in the USA.
Cooperation and collaboration will not be an obligation, but a natural way of performing.
Integration of multiple stakeholders in the models and the security system. Increase in the participation of the public sector. Universities, think tanks and citizens.
Competence adaptation to crimes with unclear jurisdiction.
Absolute transparency in the police performance.

Less command and control. More intelligence at every level.
Implementation of Future Studies or prospective. Need to create new futures every moment.
Development of new thinking, knowledge, design, strategic, leadership, communication and decision-making models, adapted to a fast and uncertain world. Everything will be a change so there will be no need to manage it.
More flexible structures and bureaucracies.

Table 7. 20 police present and future challenges. Analysis and Prospective Centre

6. A MODEL FOR INTEGRATING KNOWLEDGE INTO THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

"In moments of crisis, only imagination is more important than knowledge."

Einstein

In an uncertainty situation such as the one we are describing we should not undervalue any piece of information, any news, event or product of the imagination that can have an effect in security. As there are many interest inputs, we should go on in the construction of models that integrate the small things (what is specialized, partial or defragmented) in models that get us closer to the vision of the Big Picture about a fact. Moreover, this should be carried out I a continuous way, from a temporal perspective, taking the past into account, but also the present and the future. Von Clausewitz pointed out "our knowledge of circumstances has increased, but our uncertainty, instead of having diminished, has only increased. The reason of this is that we do not gain all our experience at once, but by degrees". A great variety of sources, a non-lineal time and limitation of the cognitive capacities of the individual must lead to the implementation of new models for the knowledge management for security.

Cohen and Blanco (2014) suggest a decision-making model in the field of counterterrorist groups that, adapted in a generic way to the security field, integrates at least five models: a wider intelligence process and adapted to the current evolution, a decision-making process and design of public policies, the models of "connecting the dots" of RAND Corporation, the model of Evidence-based Policing enlarged and the Future Studies and Prospective (Figure3):

- A new intelligence process. The sources are not the traditional ones. Instead, imagination and creativity are included as additional sources, as well as the previous experience and knowledge (a way of "fast-thinking", according to Khaneman, but useful in cases of having to adapt urgent decisions in uncertainty environments, taking knowledge and previous experiences, but with the risk of other cognitive mistakes). The stakeholders are much more numerous than usual. The center of the system are the various "what-for" that we already said, created by Treverton. With them as a basis, knowledge or intelligence requirements are produced. The people are in the center of the system, not only the processes. Technology has further modified the classical cycle and its phases, anticipating at the moment of the obtaining issues that would be otherwise in previous phases, such as the classification, the integration of information or the sources evaluation. That is why instead of talking about phases of a cycle, that

is not the real one neither the sequential one, we point out different techniques or methodologies used for the analysis: scanning, monitoring, analysis, etc. In all these models the concept of "event" is crucial, an incident that can be important to the organization but once produced it is hard to detect. They would be possible weak signals to inchoate to early-warning systems and that, if they continue over time, they can become trends.

- The decision-making processes. The model presents the need of having right now the best possible knowledge and the best possible intelligence. At the same time, it incorporates the moment itself of making the decision, as well as the subsequent evaluation of the effects of those policies. It would incorporate all that has been pointed out in section 3 in this article.

- Enlarged evidence-based policing. Instead of considering solely the evaluation and measurement of the executed security policies, this evaluation should also reach:

  1. The way in which knowledge and intelligence are generated, taking into account all the necessary sources and actors.

  2. The process of generation of that intelligence. Methodologies and techniques. Scientific method, investigation methodologies from social sciences and structured techniques of intelligence analysis. Knowledge integration, in order for the decision-maker to have the best means before deciding.

  3. The decision-making processes, political, group or psychological aspects that affect it.

  4. The effects generated by the decision-making.

  The analysis of the effects of the adopted decisions and the evaluation of the process leads to:

  1. Fixing new knowledge or intelligence needs.

  2. Searching new procedures, methodologies or techniques.

  3. Improving communication processes.

  4. A better decision-making and strategic design.

- Future studies. It incorporates a global vision. Past, present and future are not lineal constructions; they overlap and affect each other continuously. The past affects the present and the future. Current expectations about the future introduce causal elements in its evolution. Taking the present as the moment for decision-making, it is necessary to take into consideration the past as well as the future. Especially in regard to detecting risks and future threats, as well as in regard to the possible previous fixing of the effects that the adopted measures can generate.

It is graphically represented as follows:

Figure 3. Holistic process in decision-making (Blanco and Cohen, 2014).

7. A CULTURE OF INTERNAL SECURITY AS APRT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

"If wisdom were offered me with this restriction, that I should keep it close and not communicate it, I would refuse the gift."

Seneca

Knowledge is there to be shared, to be spread, to be applied and adapted to different interest groups, to collective problem-solving. The spread of a culture of security fulfills certain goals that can be represented in a pyramid. In the base there is the obligation to inform, then the possibility to communicate, thirdly the opening of new ways of community policing, after that the possibility of co-creation and, finally, the citizen's commitment. It is necessary to have the citizens committed to the safety of everyone, trained and informed, and with a personal and collective assumption of responsibility (Blanco and Moya, 2014).

The development of a culture of security is an additional contribution to transparency and open government. It prepares the citizens for the interaction with a police body, such as Guardia Civil, very close to them.

Nowadays is National Security and its evolution what links all the actors of the security system. For National Security culture, we understand "the group of pieces of knowledge, norms, values, goals, attitudes and practices that are shared among the society and aimed at safeguarding and guaranteeing national interests" (Blanco; de la Corte; Jaime, 2014).

The most direct contribution of Guardia Civil is focused on Internal Security that, as pointed out in all the reports, is not a piece separated from International Security. The separation between the internal and the external is becoming more and more diffuse; in new areas with no jurisdiction, such as cyberspace, the concept of Internal Security still has a clear scope of action. While the armed forces have been years working on the spread of a Defense and Security Culture and the National Intelligence Center

(Centro Nacional de Inteligencia, CNI) has worked for more than 10 years in an Intelligence Culture, there are very few references to an Internal Security Culture.

First of all, it is difficult to find a conceptualization of Internal Security, and this does not happen only in Spain. This does not stop the existence of a Ministry of the Interior, in Spain, or a Homeland Security in the USA, or an Internal Security Strategy in the European Union.

In the case of the USA, the concept of Internal Security is evolving, as any current phenomenon should do. The concept becomes developed and institutionalized since the 9/11 attacks and is built adding domain areas: terrorism, disasters and emergencies, immigration and rule of law. The concept appears in different strategic documents such as the National Security Strategy from 2010, the National Strategy for Counter-terrorism from 2011, the National Strategy for Internal Security from 2008, the Quadrennial Internal Security Revision from 2010 or the Strategic Plan of the Internal Security Department from 2012.

Definitions are different in each of these documents, starting from the National Strategy for Internal Security from 2007: "a national effort for the prevention of terrorist attacks in the USA, for the reduction of America's vulnerability, for the minimization of damages and the recovery from the attacks that may occur". The National Security Strategy from 2010 enlarges the concept: "a coordination among the federal, state and local levels to prevent, protect and respond to the threats and natural disasters". In the document titled 'Botton-Up Review' from 2010, the framework is enlarged to the customs control, irregular immigration and maritime transport systems' security, apart from the areas we have already mentioned such as terrorism or disasters' management. It is perceived, though, as the construction made taking the assigned matters as a basis. In any case, the competences of Internal security mentioned in these documents vary from ones to others and do not respect a priority order, although, following the Strategic Plan from 2012, we can point out 6 clear functions: the prevention of terrorism, border security, immigration control, cyberspace security, emergency and disasters management, the resilience assurance and the fundamental support of national and economic security.

In the European Union there is not a clear concept on Internal Security either. However, there were enough reasons for its development: external borders close to fragile states, the vulnerability caused by the free internal movement and transport, the high population density, the distribution of competences between the EU and the Member States and the existence of external and internal terrorist movements, such as IRA or ETA. The Internal Security Strategy of the EU, from 2010, faces this subject and we believe that partially solves the obsolescence of the European Security Strategy form 2003, which was indirectly fixed through the report on its application from 2008.

The Internal Security Strategy points out that this concept should be understood as a wide a complete concept, that spreads into different sectors and that must face important threats, including natural disasters and the ones caused by humans. It is especially remarkable the necessary participation of different actors; police, judicial actors, health sector, social services and civil protection. However, it lacks a complete definition. Solely in the first section it indicates that Internal Security means: "the protection of the people and of the values democracy and freedom, so that everyone can enjoy its daily life with no fear". This sentence is similar to art. 104 of our Constitution,

which mentions the Security Forces of the State. According to the areas that conform the concept, the Strategy stresses the followings: terrorism, organized crime, cyber-crime, cross-border crime, violence (among young people, in sports…), natural and man-made disasters, border management and others (it points out car accidents). The document titled Interior Security Strategy of the EU in Action structures the efforts in 5 areas: organized crime, terrorism, cybercrime, border security and resilience against crisis and disasters.

In Spain, as we have already said before, there is no clear doctrine in the subject of Internal Security, but there is a doctrine about each one of its components. Moreover, the diversity of actors, much wider that in the field of Defense, has stopped the development of a common culture. The Culture of Internal Security could be defined with a combination of art.104 of the Constitution and the general definition of culture: "the group of pieces of knowledge, norms, values, goals, attitudes and practices that are shared among the society and aimed at safeguarding and guaranteeing national interests".

The role of Guardia Civil in spreading an Internal Security Culture, and its contribution to National Security, should be a leadership role. The Guardia Civil has competences in all mentioned areas. The "citizen assistance", mentioned in the mission established in its Strategic Management System, the proximity to the citizen and the goal of being a referent for the "quality, versatility and availability", as well as the values of Guardia Civil (especially its spirit of service), have an influence in both the external and the internal perspective included in that System. In the external dimension we should highlight the aim of "consolidating the citizens' security and bringing assistance, care and information with proximity and quality". In the internal processes the aim is to "promote the relations with the community and the awareness of our Institution".

Now we will list in a non-exhaustive way the means that uses Guardia Civil to spread the Culture of Security:

- Through the daily performance of its workers, men and women. This is proven to be true by the surveys from the Center for Sociological Investigations, in which Guardia Civil comes up as the institution that generates the most trust to the citizens. That confidence is achieved through closeness, proximity and the daily service.

- The webpage of Guardia Civil.

- Social media such as Twitter, and channels in YouTube, Flickr and similar.

- The cooperation with universities, that is shown in the increasing number of agreements with many different universities, students internships in Guardia Civil offices, the increasing demand of professionals of the Institution such as professors and speakers.

- The creation of a University Centre of Guardia Civil, responsible of the training of the officials of the Institution, security engineers.

- The University Institute of Internal Security Investigation (Instituto Universitario de Investigación en Seguridad Interior IUISI), created through an agreement between Guardia Civil and UNED (Distance Education University of Spain) and that each year organizes a great amount of workshops and seminars of spread and free to any citizen.

- The celebration of the patron saint of Guardia Civil, the festivity of the Body, which becomes an important event for the city in which it is celebrated each year.

- Visits of schools, groups and institutions to our offices.

- The activities that carry out the Foundation of Guardia Civil.

- The historical and patrimonial funds of Guardia Civil, especially its museum, open to visitors.

- The libraries, especially the digital one, which includes resources from the Officials Academy of Guardia Civil and a selection from the Analysis and Prospective Centre.

8. CONCLUSION

Let us love the knowledge. It is not only that it makes us free, such as Socrates pointed out. It also allows us to survive, get adapted to our world and manage uncertainty. Knowledge and the police activity are not separated worlds. Loving knowledge is loving hesitation, dissatisfaction or default. Agustín de Hipona thought that "hope has two precious children; their names are anger and courage. Anger when we see how things are and courage to stop them from staying like that". However, anger and courage are almost useless without knowledge and intelligence.

Loving the knowledge helps to love your job. Such as Steve Jobs said in his famous graduation speech of Stanford, "Your work is going to fill a large part of your life, and the only way to be truly satisfied is to do what you believe is great work. And the only way to do great work is to love what you do. If you haven't found it yet, keep looking. Don´t settle. As with all matters of the heart, you'll know when you find it. And, like any great relationship, it just gets better and better as the years roll on. So keep looking until you find it. Don't settle". The paths of knowledge never allow you to stop. Let us keep on that a do not stop, title of the poem of Walt Whitman, that begs us not to allow "to arrive to the end of the day without having grown a bit", "without having increased our dreams", or "think that the future is in yourself", and especially "learn from those who can teach you something. The experiences of those who precede us, of our death poets, help you to walk through live".

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Blanco, J. M. (2010). El conocimiento en la Guardia Civil. Cuadernos de la Guardia Civil. Ministerio del Interior.

Blanco, J. M. & Cohen, J. (2014). The future of counter-terrorism in Europe. The need to be lost in the correct direction. European Journal of Future Research, Vol.2, No. 1. Springer. Extraído el 01/01/2015 de: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs40309-014-0050-9

Blanco, J. M.; Moya, E. (2014). Open Government en seguridad pública e inteligencia, Seguridad y Ciudadanía, 10, pp. 29-49, Madrid: Ministerio del Interior.

Blanco, J. M.; De la Corte, L.; Jaime, O. (2014). Aproximación a la seguridad nacional. En De la Corte y Blanco (eds.), Seguridad Nacional, amenazas y respuestas. LID.

Booth, K. (1991). Security and emancipation. Review of International Studies, 17(4), pp313-326.

Booth, K. (2005). Beyond critical security studies. In: Booth, K. (ed.) Critical Security Studies and World Politics. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Bray, R. M.; Noble, A. M. (1978). Authoritarianism and decisions of mock injuries: evidence of jury bias and group polarization, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 12, pp. 1424-1430.

Buzan, B (1983). People, states and fear: The national security problem in international relations. University of North Carolina Press.

Davenport, T.; Prusak, L. (2000). Working Knowledge: How Organizations Manage What they Know. Harvard Business School Press.

Dente, B.; Subirats, J. (2014).Decisiones públicas. Análisis y estudio de los procesos de decisión en políticas públicas. Ariel.

Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (2010). Global Strategic Trends out to 2040. Ministry of Defence UK. Extraído el 01/01/2015 de: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33717/GST4_v9_Feb10.pdf

De la Corte, L.; Blanco, J. M. (2014). Seguridad Nacional, amenazas y respuestas. LID

Esposito, E. (2011).The Future of Futures. Cheltenham (UK), Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

Etzioni, A. (1967). Mixed-scanning. A Third Approach to Decision-Making. Public Administration Review. December 1967.

Heuer, R. J., y Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.), (1999): Psychology of intelligence analysis, Washington, D.C., Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

Hilsmnan, R. (1956). Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions, Free Press.

Hugues, T. L. (1976), The Fate of Facts in a World of Men, Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, nº 233.

Jaime, O.; Blanco, J. M. (2014). Toma de decisiones y visión de futuro para la seguridad. En De la Corte y Blanco (eds.) Seguridad Nacional, amenazas y respuestas. LID.

Janis, I. L. (1972). Victims of Gropthink. Nueva York: Houghton Mifflin.

Khaneman, D. (2013). Thinking Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux;

Kingdom, J. W. (1984). Agendas, alternatives and public policies. Boston, Little Brown.

Knorr, K. E. (1964), Foreign Intelligence and the Social Sciences, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Princeton University, Research Monograph nº 17.

Krause, K.; Williams, M. (1997). From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security. Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Laborie, M. A. (2011). La evolución del concepto de seguridad, Documento marco

05/2011. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos. Extraído el 01/01/2015 de:

http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_marco/2011/DIEEEM05-2011EvolucionConceptoSeguridad.pdf

Lia, B. (2005). Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism. Patterns and Predictions. Contemporary Security Studies. Routledge.

Limdblom, C. E. (1959). The science of muddling through. Public Administration Review, 19, pp. 78-88.

Manski, C. (2013). Public Policy in an Uncertain World. London: Harvard University-Press.

March, J. C.; Olsen, J. P. (1989). Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York, Free Press.

National Intelligence Council. Global Trends 2030. Alternative Worlds. Extraído el 01/01/2015 de: http://globaltrends2030.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/global-trends-2030-november2012.pdf

Nemeth, C. J.; Nemeth-Brown, B. (2003). Better than individuals? The potential benefits of dissent and diversity for group creativity, en P. Paulus y B. Nijstad (eds.), Group creativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nowakowska-Krystman, A. (2013). Balance Scorecard as a Control Tool of the National Security Strategy, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 13, 1, pp. 53-69.

Platt, W. (1957): Strategic intelligence production, Basic principles, New York, F.A,Praeger.

RAND Europe. (2013). Europe´s Societal Challenges. An analysis of global societal trends to 2030 and their impact on the EU. Extraído el 01/01/2015 de: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR479.html

Taleb, N. (2012). Antifragile. Things that gain form disorder. Random House.

Treverton Gregory, (2009): Gregory, Intelligence in an age of terror, Cambridge University Press,

World Economic Forum (2014).Outlook on the Global Agenda 2015. Extraído el 15/01/2015 de: http://www.weforum.org/reports/outlook-global-agenda-2015

World Economic Forum (2014). Global Risks 2014.