

NOTA DE ACTUALIDAD 10/2017

23 de junio de 2017


Carolina Alberto Notario*

Documentación de atentados con vehículos


Nota de actualidad: Documentación de atentados con vehículos

El presente documento es una síntesis de diversos informes en los que se analiza el uso de vehículos en la realización de atentados terroristas.

Vehicle Ramming Attacks: Threat Landscape, Indicators, and Countermeasures



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El informe *Vehicle Ramming Attacks: Threat Landscape, Indicators, and Countermeasures* ha sido elaborado por la TSA (Transport Security Administration) estadounidense y es accesible a través de la página web de Public Intelligence¹. Fue publicado en el mes de mayo de 2017.

En él se define el concepto de ataque por atropello (en inglés, *vehicle-ramming attack*) como «un tipo de ataque en el que el autor dirige de forma deliberada un vehículo hacia un objetivo, con el propósito de causar lesiones graves o daños materiales importantes»². Asimismo, se explica que numerosas organizaciones terroristas por todo el mundo han recomendado a sus seguidores la

realización de este tipo de atentados, ya que no requieren un gran nivel de preparación y tienen potencial para causar un considerable número de víctimas.

En este informe se incluye también una tabla con los atentados terroristas que han seguido este *modus operandi* entre mayo de 2014 y abril de 2017 (17 en total), indicando la fecha y el número de víctimas de cada uno.

A continuación se pasa a comentar que los vehículos comerciales (coches, camiones y autobuses) suponen una buena oportunidad para llevar a cabo atentados por atropello debido a su facilidad para pasar desapercibidos y debido a los enormes daños que pueden provocar. Por otro lado, se enumeran los métodos por los que los terroristas pueden obtener vehículos comerciales para usarlos como armas.

Además, este documento también recoge una serie de indicadores que pueden guiar a los trabajadores del sector de vehículos comerciales y a las fuerzas policiales a la hora de detectar si se está preparando un atentado por atropello o si se va a producir de manera inmediata.

El último punto de este informe se refiere a las medidas desarrolladas por la TSA y destinadas a evitar la realización de este tipo de documentos en territorio estadounidense. Están dirigidas especialmente a conductores, a trabajadores del sector de alquiler y compra de vehículos y a organizadores de grandes eventos.

Como conclusión, este documento insiste en la necesidad de prevenir la realización de atentados terroristas por atropello y anima a los ciudadanos a colaborar con las fuerzas policiales si observan algo sospechoso.

¹ <https://publicintelligence.net/tsa-vehicle-ramming/>

² Traducción propia.

Vehicle Attacks: Ramming increasing, VBIEDs rare

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(U//FOUO) VEHICLE ATTACKS: RAMMING INCREASING, VBIEDS RARE

(U//FOUO) Use of vehicles by violent extremists for ramming attacks has increased steadily, while use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) remains rare outside the Middle East. Given the ease with which ramming attacks can be accomplished, it is likely use of this tactic will continue to rise. Unlike VBIEDs, ramming attacks require little specialized training or skill, present minimal risk of detection when acquiring the weapon, and offer flexibility with regard to preparation, timing, and target. Foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) have pointedly encouraged use of vehicle ramming attacks, offering explicit tactical advice on vehicle selection, driving tips to maximize fatalities, and targeting suggestions that include parades, festivals, street fairs, outdoor markets or conventions, political rallies, and other crowded targets of opportunity.

(U//FOUO) VBIED trends have moved toward simpler bombs built with grouped, pressurized gas cylinders; materials are readily available and raise little suspicion at purchase, and instructions for building the bombs have been published in English-language extremist magazines. VBIEDs remain attractive weapons because successful deployment generates significant damage, can produce high death tolls, and garners high-profile media coverage. Sophisticated VBIEDs constructed with fuels, fertilizers, and other chemicals are infrequently used, reflecting increased barriers to material acquisition, lack of specialized training and knowledge to construct the weapon, and high risk of detection and interdiction during these phases of the attack.



(U) "Car Intifada - Da'esh" refers to the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Shams by its Arabic acronym, and encourages car ramming attacks as part of the new Intifada (uprising) in Jerusalem; posted on Facebook^{U//FOUO} 26 April 2015. Image: MEMRI

JOINT REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER SNAPSHOT

(U) Recent Extremist Messaging Encourages Vehicle Ramming Attacks

(U//FOUO) In 2016, FTOs actively encouraged vehicle ramming attacks in simple, clear terms in English-language extremist magazines. In a September 2014 speech, Islamic State in Iraq and ash-Shams (ISIS) spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani told listeners to "run over [infidels] with your car," adding "It is immaterial if the infidel is a combatant or a civilian. They are both enemies. The blood of both is permitted."

(U//FOUO) Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS have both published explicit tactical advice/direction for vehicular attacks. Instructions for selecting a suitable vehicle, driving to increase lethality, potential targets, and ways to claim attacks in the name of a given FTO are among the tactics explained in detail. Some advice (attaching blades to the wheel of a car to "mow" down victims) seems fanciful; instructions for building gas cylinder bombs may be riskier and harder to accomplish than they appear on the page.

(U) Vehicle attack advice offered in English-language extremist magazines consists of:

- (U) 2016 | ISIS, *Rumiyah 3: Just Terror Tactics: Vehicle Attacks*; advice to improve lethality
- (U) 2016 | AQAP, *Inspire Guide 2: Nice Operation, France*; examines truck ramming attack
- (U) 2014 | AQAP, *Inspire 12: Car Bombs in America*; gas cylinder vehicle bomb instructions
- (U) 2010 | AQAP, *Inspire 2: The Ultimate Mowing Machine*, car fitted with blades

(U) Vehicle Attack Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

(U//FOUO) Vehicle ramming attacks may appeal to individuals with limited or no access to explosives or weapons. VBIEDs, though difficult to construct, are still a desirable weapon. Possible indicators of preparation for vehicle attacks may include:

- (U//FOUO) Purchase, rental, or theft of large or heavy-duty vehicles or equipment, accompanied by other indicators such as undue nervousness, cash payments, multiple licenses, or lack of appropriate licenses or class endorsements;
- (U//FOUO) Unusual modification to commercial motor vehicles, heavy equipment, passenger cars, and sport-utility vehicles (SUVs), such as homemade attempts to reinforce the front of the vehicle with metal plates;
- (U//FOUO) Commercial motor vehicles or heavy equipment being operated erratically, at unusual times, or in unusual locations, particularly in heavy pedestrian areas;
- (U//FOUO) Vehicle operator's apparent unfamiliarity with commercial motor vehicle or heavy equipment operation (unable to back up, trouble with shifting, poor lane tracking, and so forth);
- (U//FOUO) Acquisition of suspicious quantities of weapons, ammunition, or materials that could be used to produce explosives, such as hydrogen peroxide, acetone, gasoline, propane, or fertilizer;
- (U//FOUO) Loitering, parking, or standing in the same area over multiple days with no reasonable explanation; and
- (U//FOUO) Attempts to infiltrate closed areas where traffic usually moves, but where crowds are gathered, such as street festivals or farmers' markets.

(U) Potential Mitigation Measures

(U//FOUO) Preoperational vehicle attack indicators are difficult to detect and interdict. Lone offenders or small groups may act quickly and independently, with minimal or no guidance from FTOs. Prevention requires a layered approach, including outreach/education/training efforts, suspicious activity reporting, public-private sector information sharing, and hardening of potential physical targets.

- (U//FOUO) Encourage public reporting through community training. Potential offenders may display an observable range of activities; friends, family, and community members may be aware of and best-positioned to identify at-risk individuals. Maintain ongoing, open dialog between the private sector, public safety agencies, fusion centers, and Joint Terrorism Task Forces to encourage suspicious activity reporting and ensure information is shared in a timely manner. Ensure personnel receive training and briefings on active shooter preparedness, improvised explosive device (IED) and VBIED awareness and recognition, TripWires, and suspicious activity reporting procedures.

MAJOR VEHICLE ATTACKS, 1995-PRESENT (U//FOUO)

RAMMING 2017 JAN 08 Jerusalem, Israel 4 killed, 12 injured Vehicle: truck Place: bus stop Target: soldiers		Palestinian
VBIED, DISRUPTED 2017 JAN 02 Saarbrücken, Germany Unknown vehicle, place, target		ISIS-inspired
RAMMING 2016 DEC 19 Berlin, Germany 12 killed, 56 injured Cargo truck, Christmas market, civilians		ISIS-inspired
RAMMING + STABBING 2016 NOV 28 Columbus, Ohio 0 killed, 11 injured Car + knife, university, civilians		ISIS-inspired
VBIED, FAILED 2016 NOV 03 Paris, France 0 killed, 0 injured Car, street near cathedral, civilians		ISIS-inspired
RAMMING 2016 JUL 14 Nice, France 85 killed, 308 injured Cargo truck, Bastille Day event, civilians		ISIS-inspired
RAMMING 2015 JUN 15 St. Quentin Fallavier, France 0 killed, 2 injured Van, street, civilians		ISIS-inspired
RAM + STAB, DISRUPTED 2015 APR 17 Melbourne, Australia 0 killed, 2 injured Car + knife, Anzac Day parade, police officer		ISIS-inspired
RAMMING 2014 DEC 22 Nantes, France 1 killed, 0 injured Car, Christmas market, civilians		ISIS-inspired
RAMMING 2014 DEC 21 Dijon, France 0 killed, 2 wounded Car, Christmas market, civilians		ISIS-inspired
RAMMING 2014 NOV 05 Jerusalem, Israel 1 killed, 14 wounded Car, transit station, police + civilians		Palestinian
RAMMING 2014 OCT 22 Jerusalem, Israel 2 killed, 7 injured Car, transit station, civilians		Palestinian
RAMMING 2014 OCT 20 Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Canada 2 killed, 7 injured Car, transit station, civilians		ISIS-inspired
VBIED, DISRUPTED 2013 DEC 13 Wichita, Kansas Van, airport/airlines, civilians		ISIS-inspired
RAMMING 2013 MAY 22 Woolwich, England 1 killed, 0 injured Car + knife, military facility, soldier		ISIS-inspired
VBIED, DISRUPTED 2013 FEB 08 Oakland, California Car, bank, civilians		Taliban-inspired
VBIED, DISRUPTED 2010 NOV 26 Seattle, Washington Car, Christmas tree lighting ceremony, civilians		Al-Qa'ida-inspired
VBIED, FAILED 2010 MAY 01 New York City, New York 0 killed, 0 injured Car, tourist location, civilians		Taliban-linked
RAMMING 2008 JUL 02 Jerusalem, Israel 3 killed, 30+ injured Bulldozer, street, civilians		Palestinian
RAMMING + VBIED, FAILED 2007 JUN 30 Glasgow, Scotland 0 killed, 5 injured Car, airport terminal entrance, civilians		Al-Qa'ida-linked
VBIED, FAILED 2007 JUN 29 London, England 0 killed, 0 injured Car, nightclub, civilians		Al-Qa'ida-linked
RAMMING 2006 MAR 03 Chapel Hill, North Carolina 0 killed, 9 wounded Car, pedestrian area, civilians		Jihad-inspired
VBIED 1995 APR 19 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 168 killed, 680 injured		Anti-government

(U//FOUO) FOR FEEDBACK [CLICK HERE](#) | Published 22 February 2017. For additional information, see JRIC Bulletin "Vehicle Attacks | Ramming Increasing, VBIEDs Remain Rare", published 22 February 2017. This document addresses Homeland Security Information Needs (HSIC) 8.1, 8.3, 8.6, 8.9 and 8.10, and JRIC Information Need A. To request briefings, or submit questions/comments, please contact the JRIC at jric@jric.org or (562) 345-1100. Receiving agencies are cautioned not to take actions based solely on this reporting. The information, graphics, or photographs in this document may be drawn from open-source reporting, finished intelligence products, or raw reporting.

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Terrorist Use of Vehicle Ramming Tactics

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ROLL CALL RELEASE

In Collaboration with the ITACG






13 December 2010

(U//FOUO) Terrorist Use of Vehicle Ramming Tactics

(U//FOUO) Terrorists overseas have suggested conducting vehicle ramming attacks—using modified or unmodified vehicles—against crowds, buildings, and other vehicles. Such attacks could be used to target locations where large numbers of people congregate, including sporting events, entertainment venues, or shopping centers. Vehicle ramming offers terrorists with limited access to explosives or weapons an opportunity to conduct a Homeland attack with minimal prior training or experience.

- (U) **Indicators:** Although a single indicator may not be suspicious, one or more might indicate a ramming attack is being developed, based on the specific facts or circumstances. A ramming attack can be conducted with little to no warning.
- (U//FOUO) Unusual modifications to commercial motor vehicles, heavy equipment, passenger cars, and sports utility vehicles (SUVs), such as homemade attempts to reinforce the front of the vehicle with metal plates.
 - (U//FOUO) The purchase, rental, or theft of large or heavy-duty vehicles or equipment, such as SUVs, trucks, or commercial motor vehicles, if accompanied by typical indicators such as nervousness during the purchase, paying in cash, or lack of familiarity with the vehicle's operations.
 - (U//FOUO) Commercial motor vehicles or heavy equipment being operated erratically, at unusual times, or in unusual locations, particularly in heavy pedestrian areas.
 - (U//FOUO) Attempts to infiltrate closed areas where traffic usually moves, but where crowds are gathered, such as for street festivals or farmers' markets.
 - (U//FOUO) A vehicle operator's apparent unfamiliarity with commercial motor vehicle or heavy equipment operation (unable to back up; trouble with shifting; poor lane tracking; unfamiliarity with basic vehicle mechanics such as air brake operations, slack adjusters, fifth wheel operations, Jake brakes, engine type, or location of fire extinguishers and other emergency equipment).

(U) **Examples of Vehicle Ramming Incidents:** These examples, while not all terrorism-related, provide a quick look at the variety of vehicles and targets involved, and potential range of damage that such attacks can inflict.

Type	Target	Date	Location	Result	NCTC
Heavy vehicle (front-end loader) 	Crowd	2 Jul 08	Israel	4 killed; 45 wounded, two buses and several dozen cars damaged	
Basic vehicle (SUV) 	University campus	3 Mar 06	Chapel Hill, NC	9 wounded	
Heavy vehicle (tractor-trailer) 	Capitol building	17 Jul 01	Sacramento, CA	1 building damaged	

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(U//FOUO) For additional indicators, please see the Roll Call Release: "(U//FOUO) Possible Indicators of Use of Large Commercial Motor Vehicles as Weapons," 4 June 2010.


IA-0086-11

(U) Prepared by the DHS/ISA Homeland Counterterrorism Division, the FBI/Directorate of Intelligence, and the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group. Coordinated with DHS/ISA Cyber, Infrastructure, and Science Division. This product is intended to assist federal, state, local, and private sector first responders in developing deterrence, prevention, preemption, or response strategies.

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El documento *Terrorist Use of Vehicle Ramming Tactics* fue publicado por el Departamento de Seguridad Interior (Department of Homeland Security), en colaboración con el FBI, en el mes de diciembre de 2010. Se puede acceder a él a través de la página web de Public Intelligence⁴.

Aunque este informe fue elaborado en 2010, bastante antes del aumento del uso de esta táctica en Occidente, ya alertaba sobre la posibilidad de que ocurrieran atentados con vehículos en ocasiones en las que un gran número de personas pueda congregarse en un mismo lugar, tales como eventos deportivos o conciertos. De la misma manera, se explica que este tipo de atentados presenta una gran oportunidad de causar daños a un terrorista con acceso limitado a explosivos o a armas de fuego.

En este documento también se introducen, por primera vez, los indicadores que pueden señalar la realización de un atentado terrorista con un vehículo como arma principal y que también se incluyen en *Vehicle Ramming Attacks: Threat Landscape, Indicators, and Countermeasures* y en *Vehicle Attacks: Ramming increasing, VBIEDs rare*.

⁴ <https://publicintelligence.net/ufouo-dhs-fbi-warning-terrorist-use-of-vehicle-ramming-tactics/>

Vehicular Attacks: A Lethal, Easily-Executed Type of Attack; Most are carried out by lone operatives unaffiliated with terrorist organizations although sometimes inspired by them



The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
at the Israeli Intelligence & Heritage Commemoration Center

July 24, 2016

Vehicular Attacks: A Lethal, Easily-Executed Type of Attack Most are carried out by lone operatives unaffiliated with terrorist organizations although sometimes inspired by them



Making vehicular attacks more lethal. Left: Caterpillar front loader used in a vehicular attack in Jerusalem, July 2, 2008. Three people were killed and 70 wounded (Israeli Government Press Office, July 2, 2008). Right: Refrigerator truck used in the terrorist attack in Nice where 84 people were killed and 200 wounded (Twitter, July 14, 2016).

Overview

1. The vehicular attack carried out on the Nice promenade on Bastille Day, July 14, 2016, claimed the lives of 84 people and wounded 200. It was the most lethal vehicular attack ever carried out, no less lethal than most of the other terrorist attacks carried out in Europe during the past year. However, unlike the ISIS attacks, it was **relatively simple**. It did not demand complex planning or logistics, intelligence collection or deploying a squad of foreign terrorists, as in the terrorist attacks in Istanbul, Brussels and Paris.
2. The vehicular attack in Nice was carried out by a French citizen of Tunisian extraction. He was apparently **inspired by ISIS** but as far as is known, was **not in direct communication with the organization, and did not receive instructions or support from it**. Three months ago an ISIS spokesman issued a call to the organization's supporters in France, America and their allies to kill **so-called "infidels" in any way possible, including vehicular attacks**. On another occasion

Este artículo fue publicado por el Centro General Meir Amit de información sobre inteligencia y terrorismo, una institución israelí, en julio de 2016. Es accesible desde su página web⁵.

⁵ http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/articles/Art_21041/E_133_16_830403212.pdf

En la primera parte del documento se hace un resumen del atentado del 14 de julio de 2016 en la ciudad francesa de Niza y se relaciona lo ocurrido con los mensajes difundidos por el Estado Islámico meses antes, en los que se animaba a los seguidores de la organización a llevar a cabo atentados con vehículos contra objetivos occidentales.

A continuación, se explica que este tipo de ataques han estado ocurriendo en Israel desde el comienzo de la primera Intifada en 1987, no solo con vehículos comerciales, sino también con vehículos pesados. En total, entre 2015 y julio de 2016 se produjeron 31 atentados con vehículos en Israel.

El documento también incluye tres anexos: en el primero se enumeran algunos de los atentados con vehículo ocurridos en Israel entre 2008 y el momento de publicación del informe, mientras que en el segundo se expone una parte de los mensajes distribuidos por Internet en los que se anima a llevar a cabo este tipo de ataques contra objetivos israelíes. En el tercer y último anexo se incluyen enlaces a otros documentos similares publicados por el Centro y relacionados con el tema.


How and why vehicle ramming became the attack of choice for terrorists

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How and why vehicle ramming became the attack of choice for terrorists

March 29, 2017 1:45pm BST



Aftermath of the 2016 Berlin attack. EPA/Rainer Jensen


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Partners

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Este artículo fue publicado por The Conversation en marzo de 2017 y es accesible desde su página web⁶.

En él se explica que el uso de vehículos en atentados terroristas es relativamente común en Oriente Medio desde la década de los años 80. Sin embargo, esta táctica no recibió gran atención mundial hasta 2010, cuando Al Qaeda en la Península Arábiga publicó un documento, llamado *The Ultimate Mowing Machine*, en el que explicaba cómo realizar atentados por atropello y animaba a sus seguidores a poner sus instrucciones en práctica. El Estado Islámico reconoció este método en 2014 y publicó su propia guía en el año 2016.

El autor expone que los atentados por atropello suponen un buen recurso para terroristas debido a que no requieren una preparación exhaustiva, a que su arma principal (es decir, un vehículo) puede ser adquirida de forma completamente legal, y a que suelen ser bastante efectivos en lo que se refiere al número de víctimas y daños materiales ocasionados.

⁶ <https://theconversation.com/how-and-why-vehicle-ramming-became-the-attack-of-choice-for-terrorists-75236>